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We use newly constructed state-speciﬁc data to explore the implications of common modeling choices
for measures of research returns. Our results indicate that state-to-state spillover effects are important,
that the research and development lag is longer than many studies have allowed, and that misspeciﬁ
cation can give rise to signiﬁcant biases. Across states, the average of the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratios
is 21:1, or 32:1 when the spillover beneﬁts to other states are included. These ratios correspond to real
internal rates of return of 9% or 10% per annum, much smaller than those typically reported in the
literature, partly because we have corrected for a methodological ﬂaw in computing rates of return.

In the United States, public support for invest
ments in agricultural R&D continues to wane
in spite of consistently high reported rates
of return to agricultural R&D. This appar
ent paradox could simply reﬂect government
failure, but it might also reﬂect skepticism
about the evidence. Certainly some public pol
icymakers and some economists—ourselves
among them—are skeptical about the very high
rates of return reported by some studies, and
“gilding the lily” might have damaged the case
for public support (Alston et al. 2000).

Data limitations require the imposition of
restrictive assumptions that have unknown
implications for estimation bias, but upward
biases may also have resulted from particular
modeling choices that were not made necessary
by data constraints (Alston and Pardey 2001).
This paper reports the main results from a longrunning project in which we set out to obtain
new and improved estimates of the returns to
U.S. public agricultural research and develop
ment (R&D), to evaluate the role of modeling
choices versus fundamental factors in inﬂuenc
ing the ﬁndings and thus to provide a clearer
understanding of the conﬁdence that can be
placed in the estimates.
To explore the consequences of common
modeling choices and their implications for
measures of research returns, we make use
of an uncommonly rich and detailed panel
of state-level data, which we developed for
this purpose. It includes annual state-speciﬁc
data on agricultural productivity for each
of the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the
years 1949–2002 and on agricultural research
and extension expenditures by the federal
and state governments over the years 1890–
2002. The indexes of multifactor productiv
ity (MFP) are Fisher ideal discrete approx
imations of Divisia indexes that reﬂect a
careful effort to account for variation over
time and among states in the composition
of the aggregates of inputs and outputs and

thereby minimize the role of index number
problems. In our econometric models, we pay
particular attention to the speciﬁcation of the
research lag structure and models of spa
tial spillovers, but to illustrate the role of
fundamental factors, we compare the result
ing estimates with simple approximations that
abstract from the detail of the spatial and
temporal aspects.
A more complete description of the data,
models, and many of the results discussed here
can be found in the study by Alston et al.
(2010). Beyond presenting a succinct synthe
sis of the main results found by Alston and
colleagues, we here extend that work in two
important ways. First, we present new evidence
on the time-series properties of the models,
which provides additional support regarding
the robustness of the results. Second, we
present alternative measures of the rate of
return to the investments, demonstrating why
many of the previous results in the literature
should be treated with skepticism.

Modeling Agricultural Research and
Productivity
At the center of our empirical work is a model
of state-speciﬁc productivity growth as a func
tion of investments in agricultural research,
built on foundations laid by Griliches (1964,
1979) and Evenson (1967), among others, as
reviewed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1998)
and Alston et al. (2010). Underlying the pro
ductivity patterns are changes in aggregate
measures of inputs and outputs. In 2002, U.S.
agriculture produced 2.6 times the quantity
of output produced in 1949. It did this with
marginally less aggregate inputs such that MFP
grew faster than output. Our estimates indi
cate that output from agriculture increased on
average by 1.68% per year over the period
1949–2002, while inputs used by agriculture
declined by 0.11% per year; so, measured
MFP grew by 1.78% per year. These averages
reﬂect patterns of input and output growth
that varied dramatically among the 48 con
tiguous states. Some states had both inputs
and outputs growing, some had both falling,
but the majority had output growing against
a declining input quantity, and all had pos
itive rates of MFP growth over the years
1949–2002, which ranged from 0.84% per year
in Wyoming to 2.48% per year in North
Carolina.

Investments in agricultural research and
extension also evolved dramatically over the
period of our analysis, with important changes
both in the emphasis among federal, state,
and local government and private sources of
funding and in the balance of effort among per
forming agencies. We use state-speciﬁc panel
data on investments in publicly performed
research since 1890 and in extension since 1915,
to develop research and extension knowledge
stocks to be used in models of productivity
over the years 1949–2002. Over that period
total expenditure on public research and exten
sion grew dramatically in total but unevenly.
The intensities of spending on research and
extension conducted by state government insti
tutions have become quite varied, reﬂecting
differences among states in growth in agri
cultural production, as well as in their invest
ments in the creation and diffusion of knowl
edge.
Model Structure
We begin with a model in which agricultural
productivity in every U.S. state (excluding
Alaska and Hawaii) depends on past agri
cultural research and extension conducted by
itself and every other U.S. state (a total of
48 states) and intramural research conducted
by the USDA.1 We can express this model in
general terms, mathematically, as
(1)

MFPi,t = f i (Rt , Et )

where MFPi,t is multifactor productivity in
state i in year t, and Rt is a 49 × (LR + 1)
matrix in which the typical element, Rj,t−k ,
is the investment in public agricultural R&D
made by state j (for j = 1, . . . , 48) or the USDA
(for j = 49) in year t–k; similarly, Et is a 48 ×
(LR + 1) matrix in which the typical element,
Ej,t−k , is the investment in public agricultural
extension made by state j in year t–k; LR
denotes the maximum number of years over
which a given investment can affect MFP; and
k varies between zero and LR .
To implement this model we have to deﬁne
the knowledge stock variables, which requires
1
There are various ways to account for R&D activity, but with
an eye to the policy implications of the results, our intent here is
to evaluate the impacts of agricultural R&D on a “by performer”
basis (as distinct from a “by funder” or other basis). The Organisa
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (2002) provides
details on the internationally accepted standards for measuring
R&D spending and performance, which we followed in compiling
our R&D data.

jointly deﬁning the spillover relationships
(which allow for research conducted in one
state to affect productivity in another) and the
research lag distributions (which summarize
the temporal relationship between spending
and productivity). Even if the research and
extension lag lengths were modest, they would
imply an impossibly large number of research
effects to estimate, so some restrictions must
be imposed, as has been long recognized in
studies of returns to R&D. Griliches (1979)
suggested that
it is probably best to assume a func
tional form for the lag distribution on
the basis of prior knowledge and gen
eral considerations and not to expect
the data to answer such ﬁne ques
tions.That is,a“solution”to the multi
collinearity problem is a moderation
of our demands on the data—our
desires have to be kept within the
bounds of our means. (p. 106, empha
sis in original)
In our particular setting, the potential prob
lems of multicollinearity and identiﬁcation are
many times greater than in the typical study
using a single time series, since we have allowed
for 48 states with interstate spillovers in every
direction.
Previous econometric studies of effects of
agricultural research on productivity, or rates
of return to research, have almost invariably
imposed some structure (often implicitly) to
reduce the number of lag weights to be esti
mated and to impose other prior beliefs on the
shape or length of the lag (see Alston et al.
2000 for details). Like most previous studies,
and as advocated by Huffman and Evenson
(2006a), we impose some restrictions on the lag
distribution, to reduce the number of param
eters to be estimated. First, we assume that
as a baseline model, agricultural research and
extension expenditures (at least at the margin)
are fungible and can be combined into a single
aggregate research and extension variable to
which the same lag distribution would apply.2

2
This assumption may appear rather strong, but some aggrega
tion assumptions are necessary and are always made in work of this
nature. The research and extension variables themselves represent
aggregates over different types of activities having different lagged
impacts on productivity (ranging from relatively basic research to
applied outreach and advisory services, a signiﬁcant share of which
may have no relationship to production agriculture, and across dif
ferent ﬁelds of science that may have more or less relevance to
production agriculture). We examine the empirical implications of

Second, we assume that the same-shaped lag
distribution applies to a state’s research and
extension, regardless of who is adopting the
results. Thus, productivity in each of the 48
states depends on 49 state-speciﬁc knowledge
stocks (one own-state research stock, 47 otherstate research stocks, and one federal research
stock). Third, we assume that same lag shape
applies to all the states within a given model.
However, we do estimate the parameters that
deﬁne the shape and effective length of the lag,
and in that sense our approach is less restrictive
than others that simply imposed a speciﬁc dis
tribution a priori (such as the trapezoidal lag
that was introduced by Huffman and Evenson
[1993] and has been applied by many others
since). In addition, we explore the implications
of relaxing several of the baseline modeling
assumptions.
Consequently, in the baseline model, the
relationship between spending on research and
extension and the knowledge stock produced
within state i in year, t, SKi,t , can be character
ized using a single lag distribution, deﬁned in
terms of (a) an overall lag length,(b) a gestation
lag,(c) a functional form (we used a gamma dis
tribution), and, (d) within the functional form,
parameters that determine the shape of the
distribution, as follows:3
LR

(2)

SKi,t =

bk (Ri,t−k + Ei,t−k ),
k=0

where LR is the total lag length, and the bk
parameters are the lag weights that are deﬁned
by the alternative lag distributions, and these
weights sum to one:
LR

bk = 1.

(3)
k=0

this assumption later in the paper when testing the robustness of
our preferred model.
3
Our analysis is not conﬁned to this baseline model and its
particular assumptions. Importantly, unlike previous studies that
simply impose assumptions about the research and extension lag,
we examine the implications of alternatives, including the arbitrary
and untested imposition of a particular, short lag distribution shape
for extension combined with a speciﬁc trapezoidal lag distribution
for research, as used by Huffman and Evenson (1993) and others.
The results, discussed in the paper, did not especially favor the use
of separate lags for extension, while serving to illustrate the impli
cations of that choice for the estimated rates of return and the
difﬁculty of discriminating among such alternatives using the kinds
of data that are available.

Gamma Lag Distribution Model
The research lag weights (bk ) implied by the
gamma distribution are:
(4)

bk =

(k − g + 1)(δ/1−δ) λ(k−g)
LR

on the similarity of the commodity composi
tion of output between pairs of states, and we
evaluate the implications of this assumption for
results compared with the main alternatives.4
We assume a linear state-to-state spillover
relationship, and deﬁne

[(k − g + 1)(δ/1−δ) λ(k−g) ]

k=0

for LR ≥ k > g; otherwise bk = 0
where g is the gestation lag before research
begins to affect productivity, and δ and λ are
parameters that deﬁne the shape of the dis
tribution (0 ≤ δ < 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1). Here, we
assume a gestation lag of g = 0 years, but sev
eral distributions deﬁned by combinations of δ
and λ that we use imply weights very close to
zero for small values of k, resulting in a longer
effective gestation lag. In addition, based on
our own previous experience with similar data
and models (see, e.g., Pardey and Craig 1989)
and some limited pretesting as a part of the
present study, as well as a predisposition to
allow for generously long lags, we allow for
LR = 50 years. The resulting lag distribution
allows for positive contributions to the current
stock from up to 50 years of past expenditures
on research and extension, but particular val
ues of λ and δ can correspond to a pattern of
very low bk parameters, after a time, that imply
a much shorter effective maximum lag. Hence,
the research knowledge stocks are deﬁned as
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(6)

SSi,t =

where ωij is a spillover coefﬁcient, a weight
that measures the contribution of a unit of
the knowledge stock created in state j to the
knowledge stock used in state i. To deﬁne
the spillover coefﬁcients, which measure the
state-to-state spillover potential of agricultural
research and extension, we borrow and adapt
an approach introduced by Jaffe (1986) to mea
sure interﬁrm or interindustry spillover effects.
The variant used by Jaffe (1989) is closest to
what we use here. Jaffe (1989) used character
istics of the patents obtained by ﬁrms to deﬁne
a measure of technological closeness among
them. We use the output characteristics of agri
culture in the different states—representing
agro-ecological and other relevant economic
factors—to deﬁne the technological “close
ness” of states to one another. The vector of
output (value) shares fi = (fi1 , . . . , fiM ) locates
state i in M-dimensional technological space.
The corresponding measure of technological
spillover potential is deﬁned as:

LR

(5)

SKi,t =

bk (Ri,t−k + Ei,t−k )
k=0

bk =

(k + 1)(δ/1−δ) λ(k)
.
LR [
J
(δ/1−δ)
(k)
λ
(k + 1)
k=0

Spillover Weights Based on Similarity of
Commodity Composition
Previous studies have imposed various (largely
untested) assumptions to deﬁne the interstate
spillover impacts of agricultural research and
extension investments. As discussed by Alston
(2002) and Alston et al. (2010), many studies
simply ignored spatial spillovers, attributing all
state-speciﬁc impacts to own-state investments,
while those studies that have allowed for inter
state spillovers have generally deﬁned spillover
potential based on physical proximity. Here, as
a departure from those previous approaches,
we use a measure of spillover potential based

ωij SKj,t
j=i
j

(7)

ωij =

M
m=1 fim fjm
1/2
1/2
M
M
2
2
m=1 fjm
m=1 fim

where fim is the value of production of output
m as a share of the total value of agricul
tural output in state i such that these shares
fall between zero and one and sum to one
(i.e., there are a total of M different outputs
across the 48 states, and 0 ≤ fim ≤ 1 and Lm

4
The notion here is that research spillovers among states pro
ducing similar or identical commodity portfolios are likely to be
more pronounced than among states producing dissimilar or dis
tinct sets of agricultural outputs. Thus, two predominantly dairy
production states are more likely to be doing research of relevance
to each other than if one state produced only milk and the other
only oranges. To be sure, dairy (and other) production details vary
from state to state for a host of reasons, but it is unlikely that the
dairy research in New York has no application to dairy production
in Minnesota or California, as would be implied by the geograph
ical proximity restriction incorporated in the approach used by
Huffman and Evenson (1993, 2006b), for example.

fim = 1).5 To deﬁne corresponding “spillover
coefﬁcients” for measuring the state-speciﬁc
impacts of USDA research stocks (i.e., ωiF =
ωi49 , for i = 1, . . . , 48), we apply equation (7)
to index the similarity of each state’s vector of
output shares and the national vector of out
put shares.6 Then, given this speciﬁcation of the
state-to-state spillover relationships, instead
of 47 individual other-state knowledge stocks
and a federal knowledge stock in the regres
sion model, we use a single research spillover
stock tailored for each state, to represent the
aggregation of those 48 spill-in effects in that
state.

3. SSi,t is the state-speciﬁc spillover stock of
knowledge in state i in year t from spend
ing on agricultural research and extension
conducted by federal and other-state pub
lic institutions over the previous 50 years,
in real terms, constructed using the same
lag distribution parameters as for SK i,t ;
4. PRC i,t is a state-speciﬁc pasture and
rangeland condition index, measured in
September for each year and published
by the Economics, Statistics, and Market
Information System of the USDA; and
5. ei,t is a residual, with an independent and
identically distributed structure.
Simple summary statistics are presented
in table 1.

Econometric Estimation and Results
Assuming a logarithmic functional form and
augmenting the model to include state-speciﬁc
ﬁxed effects and a variable to reﬂect the effect
of weather, the model becomes
(8)

ln MFPi,t = α0i + αR ln SKi,t + αS ln SSi,t
+ γ ln PRCi,t + ei,t .

The variables are deﬁned as follows:
1. MFP i,t is a Fisher ideal index (i.e., a dis
crete approximation of a Divisia index)
of multifactor agricultural productivity in
state i in year t;
2. SK i,t is the own-state stock of knowledge
in state i in year t from own-state spend
ing on publicly performed agricultural
research and extension over the previous
50 years, in real terms;

5
A referee raised several questions about the structure and
interpretation of these coefﬁcients related to whether they may
vary over time and, as a related point, the direction of causality
(if agricultural R&D affects production patterns, then the weights
are endogenous). The relevant issues are too many to deal with
in the space available here, but many of them are discussed in
some detail by Alston et al. (2010). In the present application,
we use the average value of ωij for the sample period, which is
simply a measure of the overall similarity of the agricultural out
put mix between states, as a proxy for the state-to-state spillover
potential of agricultural research and extension. We compare the
model using this speciﬁcation with alternative speciﬁcations similar
to those typically used in the literature.
6
Paraphrasing Jaffe (1989, p. 88), in a sense ωij measures the
degree of overlap of fi and fj . The numerator will be large when
states i and j have very similar output mixes. The denominator nor
malizes the measure to be one when fi and fj are identical. Hence,
ωij will be zero for pairs of states with no overlap in their output
mix and one for pairs of states with an identical output mix; and for
the in-between cases, 0 < ωij < 1. It is conceptually similar to a cor
relation coefﬁcient. Like a correlation coefﬁcient, it is completely
symmetric: ωij = ωji , and ωii = 1.

Notably, the speciﬁcation in equation (8)
does not include any variables to represent
the stocks of knowledge from private agricul
tural research conducted in the United States
or internationally, public agricultural research
conducted in other countries, or nonagricul
tural research. The reason for excluding these
variables is that appropriate data in suitably
long time series simply are not available. The
omission of these variables could lead to biases
in the estimated effects of the included knowl
edge stocks if the omitted stocks are correlated
with the included stocks. However, private
research effects are embodied largely in inputs,
and to the extent that the beneﬁts are cap
tured through royalties or the equivalent, they
might not have much impact on measured pro
ductivity compared with an equivalent public
research achievement provided to farmers and
others for free. In addition, our adjustments for
changes in input and output quality will have
dealt with some of these impacts. This view is
supported to some extent by some recent work
by Huffman and Evenson (2006a).7 Even so,we
are conscious of the potentially biasing effects
of omitting private agricultural R&D (as well
as omitting U.S. nonagricultural research and

7
Most studies of the effects of public agricultural research on
productivity have not incorporated an explicit measure of private
research. In a signiﬁcant and rare exception, Huffman and Evenson (2006a) attempted to account for private research effects in an
analysis using U.S. state-level data (see also Huffman and Evenson
1993, 2006b). In the absence of suitably long time series of private
research expenditures, they used state-speciﬁc production weights
applied to four classes of commodity-speciﬁc patent data to deﬁne
state-speciﬁc annual ﬂows of private research outputs, which they
aggregated into state-speciﬁc stocks by applying trapezoidal lag
weights over a 19-year period and summing. The resulting measure
of “private agricultural research capital” did not make a statistically
signiﬁcant contribution to either of the productivity models that
Huffman and Evenson (2006a) reported.

Constructed using federal and other-state
government spending on agricultural research
and extension (in real 2000 dollars),
speciﬁcation of lag distribution, and ωij -values
used as weights
Measured in September for each year (published
by the Economics, Statistics, and Market
Information System of the USDA)

Own-State Stock of
Knowledge

State-Speciﬁc Spill-in Stock of
Knowledge

Pasture and Rangeland
Condition Index

SK i,t

SSi,t

PRC i,t

Constructed using 50 years of own-state
government spending on agricultural research
and extension (in real 2000 dollars) and
speciﬁcation of gamma lag distribution

Fisher ideal index agricultural output in state
i and year t

Multifactor Agricultural
Productivity

MFP i,t

Deﬁnition

Variable Name

Symbol

Table 1. Simple Summary Statistics and Data for the Productivity Model

$5.0 million
$104.8 million
$33.1 million

Minimum across all years and states
Maximum across all years and states
Average across years
All states
California
Minnesota
Wyoming

Minimum across all years and states
Maximum across all years and states
Average across all years and states

74.33
73.27
73.39
78.02

8
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$548.2 million
$1,436.0 million
$1,050.9 million

Preferred lag distribution (λ = 0.70, δ = 0.90)

Minimum across all years and states
Maximum across all years and states
Average across all years and states

Preferred lag distribution (λ = 0.70, δ = 0.90)

481.83

Maximum across all years and states
Average across years
All states
California
Minnesota
Wyoming

181.30
176.14
173.40
142.24

74.74

Value

Minimum across all years and states

Value Description

Table 2. Summary of Results for the Base Model, Top-Ranked Models
Model Details
Model rank by SSE
1
Lag Distribution Characteristics
λ
0.70
δ
0.90
Peak lag year
24
Elasticities with Respect to
Own-state SAES
0.15
Own-state extension
0.18
All own-state combined
0.32
SAES spill-ins
0.07
Intramural spill-ins
0.07
Extension spill-ins
0.09
All spill-ins combined
0.24

Model Results
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.65
0.90
20

0.80
0.85
24

0.75
0.85
19

0.85
0.80
24

0.90
0.75
27

0.60
0.90
17

0.80
0.80
17

0.13
0.15
0.28
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.31

0.15
0.18
0.33
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.22

0.13
0.16
0.29
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.30

0.15
0.18
0.33
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.22

0.16
0.19
0.35
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.19

0.12
0.13
0.25
0.12
0.11
0.13
0.36

0.14
0.15
0.29
0.10
0.10
0.12
0.31

Notes: SSE (sum of squared errors) indicates the goodness of ﬁt of the model. The elasticities are of multifactor productivity with respect to the knowledge stock
speciﬁed.

international research), and we explore this
issue in later sections.
The models were estimated using various
estimation procedures in Stata 10.0 with the
International Science and Technology Prac
tice and Policy Center (InSTePP) Production
Accounts, version 4, as described by Pardey
et al. (2009).8 We used a type of grid-search
procedure, in which we assigned values for
the parameters of the gamma lag distribution
(λ and δ), then constructed the knowledge
stock variables using these parameters along
with the expenditures on research and exten
sion and the spillover coefﬁcients (ωij ), and
then estimated the model using these con
structed stocks.9 By repeating this procedure
using different values for λ and δ, we were able
to search for the values of these parameters
that, jointly with the estimated values for the
other parameters, would best ﬁt the data. Com
bining the following eight possible values for
both λ and δ (0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85,
0.90, 0.95), a ﬁxed maximum lag (50 years in
most cases), and no gestation lag, yields a total
of 64 possible combinations. A very wide range
of shapes and effective lag lengths are encom
passed by the range of parameter values tried.

8
Version 4 of the InSTePP Production Accounts represents a
revised and updated version of the data used by Acquaye, Alston,
and Pardey (2003) and originally developed and used by Craig and
Pardey (1996). Pardey et al. (2009) provide further details on the
construction of these data, which are presented and discussed by
Alston et al. (2010).
9
This approach of estimating productivity models with precon
structed research knowledge stocks is standard in much of the
relevant previous work. Our important departure is to search across
the range of possibilities for the lag distribution used to construct
that stock and test among them, rather than simply impose one.

We initially thought we might conduct a fur
ther search over a ﬁner grid, but upon review
of our econometric results with the 64 lag dis
tributions, we concluded that it would not be
informative to do so because the top-ranked
models were nearly indistinguishable.
The base model treats state-speciﬁc research
and extension symmetrically, such that the
same lag weights and spillover coefﬁcients
apply to both research and extension. This
model was estimated using ordinary least
squares with state-speciﬁc intercepts, which is
a ﬁxed-effects panel data estimator, for each of
the 64 lag distributions.10 Table 2 summarizes
the main results for the highest-ranked eight
models, arranged in order according to crite
ria of goodness-of-ﬁt (sum of squared errors),
highest to lowest from left to right. The bestﬁtting model was obtained with values for λ =
0.70 and δ = 0.90, implying a peak lag weight at
year 24, as seen in ﬁgure 1.11 Among the mod
els in table 2, the shape of the lag distribution
was fairly similar across the top-ranked mod
els compared with other models that did not
ﬁt as well. The peak lag varied somewhat, but
the implied values for the elasticities of MFP
with respect to the various knowledge stocks
were very similar across the eight models—
about 0.32 for own-state research and about
0.24 for spill-ins.
10
We established that a ﬁxed-effects estimator was preferred to
a random-effects estimator using Hausman’s (1978) speciﬁcation
test for ﬁxed or random effects. The results are presented, along
with additional diagnostic tests, by Alston et al. (2010, table 10-4).
11
Figure 1 also shows the trapezoidal lag structure used by
Huffman and Evenson (1993) and many others, plus a parame
terization of our gamma distribution that closely approximates this
speciﬁc trapezoidal form.

FGLS models to those in the base ﬁxed-effects
models, we were fairly certain that any autocorrelation of the residuals and issues of unit
roots related to the state-speciﬁc MFP series
were not substantially affecting the consistency
of the ﬁxed-effects estimates.12

0.06
0.05

Weight

0.04
0.03
Trapezoid

0.02
0.01
0.00

Gamma
λ=0.70, δ=0.90

Time-Series Properties of the Data

Gamma
λ=0.75, δ=0.80

0

10

20
30
Number of lag years

40

50

Figure 1. Gamma and Trapezoidal lag distri
butions.
Model Diagnostics
The analysis generally resulted in highly sig
niﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates; however, we also
sought to verify the consistency of the esti
mates after controlling for some additional
econometric issues. Speciﬁcally, we were con
cerned with autocorrelation of the residuals
and unit roots in the state-speciﬁc MFP series,
which can result in spurious parameter esti
mates. To address this concern, we reestimated
the models in ﬁrst-difference form (i.e., with
all of the variables speciﬁed in logarithmic
differences and absent an intercept term). In
most cases ﬁrst-differencing resulted in simi
larly shaped preferred lag distributions, as well
as similar estimates of elasticities for a given
lag distribution shape compared with the base
models.
Heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous
correlation were not of primary concern given
the large sample size, the asymptotic properties
of the estimators, and the statistical signiﬁ
cance of the coefﬁcient estimates. However,
we also estimated the full grid of lag dis
tributions using a feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) procedure that corrected for
heteroskedasticity within states, contempora
neous correlation among states, and ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation of the residuals. The estimated
elasticities from the FGLS estimation proce
dures were very similar to those from the
ﬁxed-effects regressions presented in table 2.
For example, in the base model with the pre
ferred lag distribution, the elasticity of MFP
with respect to the own-state knowledge stock
was 0.311 using an FGLS regression proce
dure and 0.322 using a ﬁxed-effects regression
procedure, while the corresponding elastici
ties with respect to spillover knowledge stocks
were 0.241 and 0.235, respectively. Given the
pattern of similarities of the estimates in the

We also performed a formal statistical anal
ysis of the time-series properties of the vari
ables and a check of the consistency of the
parameter estimates. A visual inspection of
the data reveals that the series appear to be
highly nonstationary. However, if the variables
in the analysis are nonstationary but share the
same order of integration (e.g., I(1) behavior),
then they might approach the same stochas
tic trend. In this case a linear combination
of the variables could form a long-run equi
librium relationship that is stationary, and a
linear regression of MFP on the research stock
variables would result in consistent parame
ter estimates. Indeed, if the series were I(1)
and cointegrated, then the estimates would be
superconsistent. Stock (1987) showed that such
estimates converge to their probability limits
faster than least squares estimates in stationary
time-series models.
To establish whether our models produce
consistent parameter estimates, we proceeded
by ﬁrst examining the data for the presence
of a unit root and then establishing whether
a cointegrating relationship exists between
the variables. As a starting point, we applied
augmented Dickey–Fuller tests on a state-by
state basis for the three variables of interest,
ln MFPi,t , ln SKi,t , and ln SSi,t . Most of the statespeciﬁc data indicated the presence of a unit
root, with the ln MFPi,t series indicating a unit
root in 41 of the 48 states, ln SKi,t in 36, and
ln SSi,t in all 48.13
Given the evidence of unit roots in these
data, it is possible that a long-run equilib
rium relationship exists between the series;
therefore, a test of a cointegrating rela
tionship between the variables is warranted.
Westerlund (2007) developed a test of cointe
gration in panel data that produces four test

12
Additional comparisons of alternative estimators and models,
as well as detailed diagnostic testing of the econometric models, are
provided by Alston et al. (2010, chapter 10).
13
In each augmented Dickey–Fuller test, we set α = 5% and
included an intercept, trend, and three lags of the dependent
variable.

statistics, Gα , Gτ , Pα , and Pτ .14 Consider the
following error-correction model with one lag
of the dependent variable and one covariate:
(9)

yit = αi +βi1 yit−1 +δi0 xit +δi1 xit−1
+ βi (yit−1 − δi xit−1 ) + uit .

The parameter βi provides an estimate of the
speed of adjustment toward the long-run equi
librium, and if βi = 0, then there is no error
correction, and thus no cointegrating relation
ship between the variables. The Gα and Gτ test
statistics begin with a weighted average of the
state-speciﬁc βi parameters and their t-ratios
and test the null hypothesis that βi = 0 for all i
versus the alternative that βi < 0 for at least
one i. The Pα and Pτ test statistics pool the sam
ple over all the states and test the null hypothe
sis that βi = 0 for all i versus the alternative that
βi = β < 0 for all i. If the observations are cor
related between cross-sectional units (states),
robust critical values can be obtained through
a bootstrapping procedure. Table 3 reproduces
the panel data tests of cointegration developed
by Westerlund (2007, table 7), including the
group mean, Gα and Gτ , as well as the pooled
test statistics, Pα and Pτ . Panel (a) of table 3
shows the test results between ln MFPi,t and
ln SKi,t , and panel (b) shows the test results
between ln MFPi,t and ln SSi,t .
The null hypothesis of these tests is that
there is no cointegration between the variables.
The results of the Westerlund tests generally
indicate that a cointegrating relationship exists
between MFP and the research stock variables.
The only results indicating rejection of a cointe
grating relation are the bootstrapped versions
of Gα and Pα between ln MFPi,t and ln SSi,t , but
these results are not as robust as the tau ver
sions of the tests, which indicate that a cointe
grating relationship does exist.15 Furthermore,
the 48-state average value of the estimated
speed-of-adjustment parameters (i.e., the β̂i
parameters) is equal to −0.71 in the panel (a)
results, and −0.83 in the panel (b) results.16 The
test results in table 3 provide convincing evi
dence that the models speciﬁed in logarithms
produce superconsistent parameter estimates.
14

See also Persyn and Westerlund (2008) for additional details
about this test and its implementation in Stata.
15
Based on Monte Carlo simulations assuming cross-sectional
dependence,Westerlund (2007, p. 730) reported that:“At [a]t At not
[a]t one end of the scale, we have the Gτ and Pτ tests, which actually
appear to be quite robust to the cross-sectional correlation.”
16
These results pertain to the models that do not correct for
contemporaneous correlation among the states.

Table 3. Results from Panel Data Tests of
Cointegration
Statistic

Value

Z-value

P-value

Robust
P-value

Panel (a): Tests between ln MFP i,t and ln SK i,t
(average AIC selected lag length is 2.04 years)
Gτ
−3.93
−16.64
0.00
0.00
Gα
−12.32
−6.55
0.00
0.00
Pτ
−21.60
−11.24
0.00
0.00
Pα
−11.11
−10.20
0.00
0.00
Panel (b): Tests between ln MFP i,t and ln SSi,t
(average AIC selected lag length is 2.25 years)
Gτ
−4.32
−19.67
0.00
0.00
Gα
−10.26
−3.91
0.00
0.26
Pτ
−22.45
−12.08
0.00
0.00
Pα
−8.85
−6.78
0.00
0.16
Notes: AIC = Akaike information criterion. All calculations were done using
Stata and the “xtwest” command. The null hypothesis is that there is no coin
tegration. In each test we included an intercept term and set the lag length
according to the average AIC. The robust P-values correct for cross-sectional
dependence among the states using a bootstrapping procedure. One hundred
replications were used for the bootstrapping procedure, and the lag length was
set to one.

Finally, the formal statistical test results are
supported by the empirical observation that
our models, speciﬁed either in logarithmic or
in growth-rate form, produce similar results in
terms of the estimated elasticities.
Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios—Base-Model
Results
We used the estimated productivity model to
compute the marginal beneﬁt associated with
various hypothetical (counterfactual) changes
in research investments. Speciﬁcally, we com
puted the state-speciﬁc and national beneﬁts
from a small ($1,000) change in 1950 in expen
ditures (a) on research by a particular state,
(b) on extension by a particular state, or (c)
on USDA intramural research by the federal
government. In computing the national bene
ﬁts, we took into account that both federal and
state-speciﬁc research investments have effects
on all the states.17
The gross annual research beneﬁts (GARB)
to state i in year t were computed using the
following approximation:
(10)

GARBi,t =

ln MFPi,t Vi,t

17
This explicit simulation approach is less prone to error or mis
interpretation than is an analytically derived approximation to a
rate of return, as some studies have used.

where Vi,t is the real value (in year 2000
dollars) of agricultural production in state i
in year t, and ln MFPi,t is the proportional
change in estimated agricultural productivity
in state i in year t, associated with the sim
ulated $1,000 increase in spending in 1950.18
Since the variables are in logarithms, the sim
ulated proportional change in MFP is simply
equal to ln MFP = ln MFP1 – ln MFP0 , where
the superscript 0 denotes the predicted ln MFP
given the actual research expenditure and the
superscript 1 denotes the predicted ln MFP
with the increased (counterfactual) expendi
ture. Then, the present value in the year 2002
of beneﬁts accruing to state i (PVBi ) was com
puted using a (correspondingly real) discount
rate of r = 3% per year:
2002

(11) PVBi =

GARBi,t (1 + r)2002−t
t=1950
2002

=

ln MFPi,t Vi,t (1 + r)2002−t .
t=1950

The beneﬁt-cost ratio for that $1,000 invest
ment is given by dividing the present value
of beneﬁts by the present value of the costs:
PVC = $1, 000(1 + r)53 (= $4, 650 for r = 3%).
Hence, marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios (or beneﬁts
per dollar of additional expenditure) were
computed as Bhi /Cih = PVBhi /$4, 650, where
the superscript h denotes which of (a) one
of the 48 state-speciﬁc research expenditures,
(b) one of the 48 state-speciﬁc extension
expenditures, or (c) federal research expen
ditures was increased by $1,000 in 1950
to generate the stream of beneﬁts being
evaluated.

18
This approximation is likely to be reasonably valid as a mea
sure of the total beneﬁts for a small research-induced change in
production, as a result of a comparatively small change in research
investment. However, to the extent that these marginal changes
in research spending induce price changes, the beneﬁts will be
distributed between producers and consumers, depending on the
elasticities of supply and demand, and this might imply differences
in the spatial distribution of beneﬁts, compared with our analysis
that implicitly presumes that all of the beneﬁts are enjoyed within
the innovating state (i.e., accruing to producers or assuming an
absence of interstate and international trade). This distortion will
itself be unevenly distributed. Some states produce commodities
for which the United States as a whole does not appreciably inﬂu
ence the world price, let alone an individual state; but California,
for instance, signiﬁcantly inﬂuences world prices for a substantial
share of its production, and a sizable share of its production is con
sumed in other states. This means that there are greater spillovers
of California’s research beneﬁts than for most other states, driven
by price changes, which we have not accounted for here.

We computed marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios
for increases in investments in research con
ducted by any of the 48 State Agricultural
Experiment Stations (SAESs) or by the USDA
itself.19 Table 4 summarizes the beneﬁt-cost
ratios in terms of the regional averages (rep
resenting the simple average of the entries
for the states within each region), the min
imum, maximum, and simple average across
the 48 states, and state-speciﬁc entries for
some selected states (California, Minnesota,
and Wyoming) for the base model (the topranked model 1 in table 2). In table 4, for
each state and for each region, the entries in
columns (1) and (2) are measures of the bene
ﬁts, per dollar of expenditure, accruing to that
state (column (1), the own-state beneﬁts) and
the nation as a whole (column (2), both the
own-state beneﬁts and the spillover beneﬁts to
the other 47 states) from an increase in statespeciﬁc research spending; column (3) shows
the beneﬁts accruing to each state, or region,
or the country as a whole from an increase in
USDA intramural research expenditures.20 All
of these ﬁgures are in common terms, express
ing real, marginal beneﬁts per dollar invested
(associated with a small change in expenditure
in 1950).
Within a row in table 4, comparing columns
(1) and (2), we can compare the own-state pay
off to that state from investing in research and
extension versus the payoff to the nation as
a whole; the difference between these two is
the spillover beneﬁt per dollar. This compari
son indicates the magnitude of the distortion
in incentives for a state to conduct the quan
tity and mixture of agricultural research that

19
Here SAES research is used as a shorthand for the funds
(from all sources) spent on research undertaken by the SAESs and
selected other cooperating institutions in the same state. Thus, for
each state, we included research spending by the SAESs (includ
ing the 1890 colleges) and the state-speciﬁc veterinary medicine
schools. We excluded from our intramural USDA series research
spending by the state-speciﬁc forestry schools (for symmetry with
the coverage of our agricultural productivity series) and likewise
omitted forestry-related research spending. The cooperating state
institutions report their expenditures to USDA’s Current Research
Information System (CRIS) on a voluntary basis, and so the readily
obtainable data are neither complete nor reported in a consistent
fashion (from year to year and among states). We did a consider
able amount of work to clean up erroneous and sometimes large
reporting problems with the CRIS data for these state-speciﬁc
cooperating institutions. The extension series is an estimate of total
funding (from all sources) for state cooperative extension work
obtained from a variety of published and unpublished sources. See
Alston et al. (2010, pp. 229–236) for more details.
20
Because the base model treats state-speciﬁc research and
extension symmetrically, the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio for SAES
research in any state is the same as the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio
for extension; the same is true for the national beneﬁt-cost ratios
for state government expenditures on research and extension.

Table 4. Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios for
Research and Extension
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios
State Research and
Extension

USDA
Intramural
Own-State National Research
State or Region

(1)

(2)

(3)

Ratio
Total
48 States
Average
Minimum
Maximum
Selected States
California
Minnesota
Wyoming
Regions
Paciﬁc
Mountain
N Plains
S Plains
Central
Southeast
Northeast

are comparatively large. Spillover beneﬁts to
other states are worth $6–$16 per dollar spent
on research; and in some states—especially
states having small agricultural sectors—the
spillover beneﬁts account for the majority
of the national beneﬁts. USDA intramural
research yielded a national beneﬁt-cost ratio
of 17.5:1, generally lower than the national
beneﬁt-cost ratio for research and extension
conducted by states.

17.5
21.0
2.4
57.8

32.1
9.9
69.2

0.4
0.0
1.6

33.3
40.6
12.7

43.4
55.4
23.6

1.4
0.8
0.1

21.8
20.0
42.4
20.2
33.7
15.1
9.4

32.9
31.6
54.5
31.0
46.8
26.7
18.4

0.6
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.3
0.1

Notes: Based on model ranked 1 in table 2.

will generate the greatest national payoff, if
it attaches no value to interstate spillouts of
its research results. In California, for instance,
the marginal own-state payoff is $33.3 per dol
lar and the marginal national payoff is $43.4
per dollar; for Minnesota, the corresponding
ﬁgures are $40.6 and $55.4 per dollar; for
Wyoming, $12.7 and $23.6 per dollar.21
The own-state and national beneﬁt-cost
ratios vary considerably among states. The
own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio for state research
and extension ranges from 2.4:1 to 57.8:1,
around an average of 21.0:1. Similarly, the
national beneﬁt-cost ratios range from 9.9:1
to 69.2:1, around an average of 32.1:1. The
spillover beneﬁts are relatively constant across
the states, and thus variation in the ownstate beneﬁts drives most of the interstate
differences in national beneﬁts from SAES
research and extension. Hence, spillovers typi
cally represent a smaller share of the total ben
eﬁts in those states where own-state beneﬁts

21
Rounding to the nearest whole dollar arguably conveys the
appropriate degree of precision of these estimates, but we report
them here and elsewhere in the text to one decimal place to
facilitate cross-referencing with the relevant table.

Effects of Alternative Speciﬁcation Choices
We tried a range of variations in the model
speciﬁcation, including (a) different functional
forms for the model (linear rather than log
arithmic, and estimated in ﬁrst-differences or
growth rates rather than in levels), (b) differen
tial treatment of the lag structure for extension
compared with research (including a 4-year
geometric lag for extension rather than the 50
year gamma lag as used for research, with or
without allowing interstate spillovers of exten
sion effects), (c) a different lag distribution
shape (a 35-year trapezoidal lag model, as used
by Huffman and Evenson [1993] rather than a
50-year gamma lag model), (d) different speci
ﬁcations of the spillover relationship (including
models with no spillovers or spillovers based on
proximity according to USDA regions rather
than our model based on the similarity of
commodity composition), and (e) alternative
restrictions on the maximum lag length for
research. Combining all of these variations
implied a large number of alternative speciﬁ
cations to be estimated and compared. Based
on an evaluation of the statistical performance
of the models and other implications, we gen
erally favor the base model, in logarithms, over
all the alternatives. The speciﬁcation choice
that had the most profound implications for
the estimates was the choice of a linear versus
logarithmic functional form, and our statistical
tests clearly favored the logarithmic speciﬁca
tion, which has been the standard choice in
published work.
In table 5 we present the results from a
selection of alternative models, summarized
in terms of the own-state and national bene
ﬁts from research and extension conducted by
individual states, as well as the national beneﬁt
from USDA intramural research. In each case,
as appropriate, we present the results using the
best-ﬁtting gamma distribution for the partic
ular model speciﬁcation. Across all the mod
els summarized in table 5, some consistent

Table 5. Effects of Speciﬁcation Choices on Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio for

Own-State Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio
for SAES Research
Model

Min.

Max.

Average

SAES Research
Min.

Max.

USDA Research

Average

Total

Ratio
Functional Form
Logarithmic
Growth (ﬁrst-difference
logarithmic)
Linear
First-difference linear
Extension Treatment
50 gamma lags with
spillovers
50 gamma lags without
spillovers
4 geom. lags with spillovers
4 geom. lags without
spillovers

2.4
1.4

57.8
29.4

21.0
10.7

9.9
15.9

69.2
52.1

32.1
32.2

17.5
33.7

0.2
0.2

43.9
51.3

10.0
11.2

14.2
16.7

74.4
84.5

39.7
46.3

47.0
55.4

2.4

57.8

21.0

9.9

69.2

32.1

17.5

2.3

55.9

20.3

14.1

73.6

37.7

27.3

1.3
1.3

27.8
28.5

9.3
9.5

16.2
23.9

50.5
64.5

31.4
42.7

34.7
52.0

57.8
53.5
27.8

21.0
19.8
9.3

9.9
18.0
16.2

69.2
75.4
50.5

32.1
41.2
31.4

17.5
33.6
34.7

34.0

11.8

20.2

61.0

38.2

41.3

57.8
48.5
90.0

21.0
17.6
33.7

9.9
6.6
4.5

69.2
62.4
90.0

32.1
24.8
33.7

17.5
60.5
n/a

2.4
2.4
2.5
1.3

57.8
56.7
39.5
27.8

21.0
20.4
14.8
9.3

9.9
11.7
17.2
16.2

69.2
71.0
63.0
50.5

32.1
20.4
36.3
31.4

17.5
21.9
33.7
34.7

1.1

27.0

8.8

15.3

48.9

30.1

33.4

1.7

29.4

10.4

17.6

55.0

33.7

36.6

Lag Distribution for Research (R)
and Extension (E)
50-year gamma, R&E
2.4
35-year trap., R&E
3.4
50-year gamma, R; 4-year
1.3
geom., E
35-year trap., R; 4-year
2.2
geom., E
Spillovers
Based on output mix
2.4
Based on USDA regions
2.3
No spillovers
4.5
Research Lag Length
50-year gamma, R&E
35-year gamma, R&E
20-year gamma, R&E
50-year gamma, R; 4-year
geom., E
35-year gamma, R; 4-year
geom., E
20-year gamma, R; 4-year
geom., E
Note: trap. = trapezoid; geom. = geometric.

patterns emerge in the estimates. First, the
different models imply a range of estimates for
the social beneﬁt-cost ratio for USDA intra
mural research, but in every model the ratio is
much greater than 1.0. Second,in every case the
national beneﬁt-cost ratios for SAES research
are much greater than 1.0 in every state,and the
average values across the 48 states are quite
large. Third, the national beneﬁt-cost ratios
for SAES research are large relative to the
own-state beneﬁt-cost ratios. In all but two of
the models (the linear model in levels or in

ﬁrst-difference form), the marginal own-state
beneﬁt-cost ratio was greater than 1.0 in every
state, and the average value across the 48 states
was much greater than 1.0 in every model.
The different models do imply very different
ranges of estimates of beneﬁt-cost ratios for
SAES research among the states, but the over
all range is much smaller when we leave out the
clearly misspeciﬁed models that were included
for illustrative purposes.
The implication of these results is that spec
iﬁcation choices do inﬂuence the results, but

not in ways that change the primary mes
sages. The marginal social beneﬁts from agri
cultural research and extension are generally
very large relative to the costs, though the
beneﬁt-cost ratios vary among states system
atically depending on the characteristics of the
states; and the spillover beneﬁts are an impor
tant component of the total beneﬁts, such that
the national beneﬁts are much greater than the
own-state beneﬁts from SAES research and
extension, with the implication that individ
ual states can be expected to underinvest in
these activities from a national perspective. If
accurate, these high own-state and even higher
national beneﬁt-cost ratios represent evidence
of past underinvestment by both the state
and federal governments in public agricultural
research.

Credibility of Results
Our measures of beneﬁt-cost ratios are large,
and it is natural to be skeptical. One way
to address that skepticism is to set aside
the complex models and simply compute the
value of the growth in agricultural productiv
ity and compare it with the cost of agricultural
research. In this section we present simple mea
sures of this nature, which abstract from the
issues of spatial spillovers and R&D lags that
were central to our econometric analysis.
The Value of Productivity Growth
Over the period 1949–2002, our index of MFP
more than doubled, from 100 in 1949 to about
257 in 2002, and if aggregate input had been
held constant at the 1949 quantities, output
would have increased by a factor of 2.6:1.
Of the actual output in 2002, only 39% (i.e.,
100/257 = 0.39) could be accounted for by
conventional inputs using 1949 technology,
holding productivity constant. The remaining
61% is accounted for by economies of scale
along with improvements in infrastructure
and inputs and other technological changes.
Hence, of the total production value, worth
$173.3 billion in 2002, only 39%, or $67.3 bil
lion, could be accounted for by conventional
inputs using 1949 technology, and the remain
ing $106.0 billion is attributable to the factors
that gave rise to improved productivity.Among
these factors is new technology, developed and
adopted as a result of agricultural research and
extension.

The actual value of agricultural output (AV t )
can be divided into two parts: (a) one repre
senting what the value of output would have
been, given the actual input quantities, if pro
ductivity had not grown since 1949—i.e., the
hypothetical value, HVt = AVt × (100/MFPt );
and (b) another, a residual, representing the
value of additional output attributable to pro
ductivity growth—i.e., residual value, RVt =
AVt − HVt = AVt × (MFPt − 100)/MFPt . As
productivity increases over time, the share of
the value of production attributable to produc
tivity growth increases. Among the 48 states,
the share of the total value of agricultural
output in 2002 attributable to growth in pro
ductivity since 1949 averaged 58% but ranged
from as low as 36% (Wyoming) to as high as
79% (Mississippi).
To summarize the stream of values of agri
cultural output attributable to productivity
improvements, the yearly residual values, RV t
(deﬁned above), were expressed in constant
(2000) dollars. The deﬂated values were com
pounded at a real interest rate of 3% per
annum and evaluated in the year 2002. The
resulting stream of values of agricultural out
put attributable to productivity improvements
is equivalent to a onetime payment of more
than $7.4 trillion in 2002, an enormous beneﬁt
from improved agricultural productivity in the
United States during the post-WWII period.
Approximate Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios
We compared the value of productivity gains
since 1949 compounded forward over 54 years
to 2002 with the expenditures on agricultural
research and extension during 1929–1982 com
pounded forward to 2002. Both costs and ben
eﬁts were converted into real terms using the
GDP price deﬂator and accumulated forward
to 2002 using a real discount rate of 3% per
annum.
The simple ratios of approximate beneﬁts in
2002 to approximate costs in 2002 are biased
estimates of the true beneﬁt-cost ratios for
several reasons. First, the existence of long
R&D lags means that we have left out some
of the relevant costs (research expenditures
prior to 1929 will have contributed to pro
ductivity growth between 1949 and 2002) and
some of the relevant beneﬁts (research expen
ditures between 1949 and 1982 will generate
beneﬁts for many years after 2002). Depend
ing on the pattern of beneﬁts and costs over
time and the effects of discounting, these two
sources of bias could be offsetting. However,

given the generally rising pattern of research
expenditures and the annual ﬂows of bene
ﬁts from productivity gains, we would expect
the effect of the understatement of beneﬁts
to outweigh the effect of the understatement
of costs, biasing the beneﬁt-cost ratios down
on balance. Second, a signiﬁcant share, per
haps as much as half of the total beneﬁts,
may be attributable to private and rest-of
world research. Third, spillover effects mean
that some of a state’s productivity growth will
be attributable to expenditures by other states
and the federal government; conversely, some
of the national beneﬁts from a state’s research
expenditures will accrue as productivity gains
in other states. In estimates at the regional
level, the distortions associated with omitting
state-to-state spillovers will be much smaller,
and in estimates at the national level they will
be absent.
In table 6 we compare estimates of approx
imate average beneﬁt-cost ratios with the pre
ferred estimates of marginal social beneﬁt-cost
ratios derived from the econometric estima
tion. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates of
marginal private and social beneﬁt-cost ratios

from the econometric model (as in table 4),
while columns (3) and (4) show the approxi
mate measures, comparing beneﬁts over 1949–
2002 with costs over 1929–1982, and allowing
for either 100% or only 50% of the total ben
eﬁts to be attributed to the public agricultural
research and extension expenditures included
in the measure of cost. The approximate mea
sure of the national beneﬁt-cost ratio could be
as high as 25.6 (the upper bound with 100%
attribution, in column (3)) or as low as 12.8
(our lower bound with 50% attribution, in col
umn (4)). In column (3), the corresponding
upper-bound estimates of regional beneﬁt-cost
ratios range from 18.1 to 63.6; the state-speciﬁc
beneﬁt-cost ratios range from 5.4 to 77.7, and
the simple average of these 48 estimates is
30.4. In column (4), the corresponding lowerbound estimates of regional beneﬁt-cost ratios
range from 9.0 to 31.8;the state-speciﬁc beneﬁtcost ratios range from 2.7 to 38.8, and the
simple average of these 48 estimates is 15.2.
The estimates of marginal social beneﬁt-cost
ratios in column (2) are remarkably similar to
the estimates of approximate average beneﬁtcost ratios with 100% attribution in column

Table 6. Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios: Approximations versus Econometric Estimates
Econometric Model, Marginal
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio

State or Region

State R&E
(own-state)
(1)

State R&E
(national)
(2)

Approximate Average
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio
Costs 1929–1982, Beneﬁts 1949–2002
100% Attribution
(3)

50% Attribution
(4)

Ratio
48 States
Average
21.0
Minimum
2.4
Maximum
57.8
Selected States
California
33.3
Minnesota
40.6
Wyoming
12.7
Regions
Paciﬁc
21.8
Mountain
20.0
N Plains
42.4
S Plains
20.2
Central
33.7
Southeast
15.1
Northeast
9.4
United States (includes USDA intramural)
USDA intramural

32.1
9.9
69.2

30.4
5.4
77.7

15.2
2.7
38.8

43.4
55.4
23.6

48.5
55.6
17.0

24.2
27.8
8.5

32.9
31.6
54.5
31.0
46.8
26.7
18.4

41.1
30.5
63.6
27.3
40.6
28.6
18.1
25.6

20.5
15.3
31.8
13.6
20.3
14.3
9.0
12.8

17.5

Notes: SAES = State Agricultural Experiment Station; R&E = research and extension.

Table 7. Terminal Values Implied by Various Rates of Return
Rate of Return, % per Annum
Number of Years from
Initial Investment

20
35
40
50

10

7
28
45
117

20

50

Terminal Value, Dollars of Beneﬁt
per Dollar of Initial Investment
38
3,325
591
1,456,110
1,470
11,057,332
9,100
637,621,500

Note: Sources developed by the authors.

(3), while the estimates of state-speciﬁc (pri
vate) marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios in column (1)
are more comparable to the approximate aver
age beneﬁt-cost ratios with 50% attribution in
column (4).
Recalibrating Rates of Return to Agricultural
R&D
We prefer to use beneﬁt-cost ratios, but the
preponderance of precedent literature reports
internal rates of returns. Having conducted a
meta-analysis of 292 studies that reported esti
mates of returns to agricultural R&D, Alston
et al. (2000, p. 55, table 12) reported an overall
mean internal rate of return for their sam
ple of 1,852 estimates of 81.3% per annum,
with a mode of 40% and a median of 44.3%.
After dropping some outliers and incomplete
observations, they conducted regression anal
ysis using a sample of 1,128 estimates with a
mean of 64.6%, a mode of 28%, and a median
of 42.0%. The main mass of the distribution of
internal rates of return reported in the litera
ture is between 20% and 80% per annum.22
Other reviews of the literature may not have
covered the same studies or done so in the same
ways but nevertheless reached similar gen
eral conclusions—for instance, Evenson (2002)
and Fuglie and Heisey (2007). In a recent
report distilling the evidence for the Coun
cil for Agricultural Science and Technology,
Huffman, Norton and Tweeten (2011, p. 6) reit
erated the typical ﬁnding but reported a point
estimate as follows:
22
When characterizing the evidence from the literature,
economists often use a range like this,but more often it is a narrower
one with a smaller mean (such as the 20%–60% range reported by
Fuglie and Heisey [2007]). As discussed by Alston et al. (2000),
such selective reporting of the literature may be misleading, giving
a false impression of both the average and the size of the range
around it.

Numerous in-depth studies at the
University of Chicago, Yale Uni
versity, Iowa State University, the
University of Minnesota, and else
where have carefully calculated the
rate of return to investing in pub
lic agricultural research. Focusing
on the contribution of productivityoriented agricultural research under
taken by the main U.S. public
agricultural research institutions—
SAESs, [veterinary medical centers],
[Agricultural Research Service], and
[Economic Research Service]—to
agricultural productivity in the 48
contiguous states, including spillover
effects to other states in the same
geoclimatic region, during 1970–2004,
the marginal real rate of return is
approximately 50% (Huffman 2010;
Huffman and Evenson 2006a,b).
It is easy to show that a 50% rate of return is
implausible for a long-term investment yield
ing beneﬁts that compound over 35 years (as
in Huffman 2010 and Huffman and Evenson
2006a, 2006b) let alone over 50 years, which we
have found is more appropriate for U.S. pub
lic agricultural R&D. Table 7 includes some
sample calculations of the terminal values of
investments of one dollar over various time
periods using alternative real rates of return to
illustrate this point. One dollar invested at 50%
per annum would be worth more than $3,000
at the end of 20 years, nearly $1.5 million at the
end of 35 years, and a whopping $637 million at
the end of 50 years. To provide some perspec
tive, if the roughly $4 billion invested in public
agricultural R&D in 2005 earned a return of
50% per annum compounding over 35 years,
by 2040 the accumulated beneﬁts would be
worth $5,824,000 billion (2000 prices)—more
than 100 times the projected U.S. GDP in 2040

Table 8. Conventional and Modiﬁed Internal Rates of Return
Conventional Internal Rate
of Return (IRR)
State R&E
(own-state)
(1)

State R&E
(national)
(2)

Modiﬁed Internal Rate
of Return (MIRR)
State R&E
(own-state)
(3)

State R&E
(national)
(4)

Percent per Year
48 States
Average
Minimum
Maximum
Selected States
California
Minnesota
Wyoming
Regions
Paciﬁc
Mountain
N Plains
S Plains
Central
Southeast
Northeast

18.9
7.4
27.6

22.7
15.3
29.1

8.8
4.8
11.4

9.9
7.7
11.7

24.1
24.7
16.8

26.1
27.3
20.9

10.2
10.6
8.2

10.7
11.3
9.5

20.2
19.0
24.9
19.5
23.1
17.6
14.0

23.5
22.7
27.0
22.7
25.9
22.0
19.0

9.1
8.9
10.7
9.0
10.1
8.3
7.2

10.1
10.0
11.2
10.0
10.8
9.7
8.8

Notes: R&E = research and extension. The ﬁgures in columns (3) and (4) are modiﬁed internal rates of return assuming a 3% reinvestment rate.

and more than 10 times the projected global
GDP in 2040.23 Clearly, as these ﬁgures illus
trate, a 50% rate of return compounding over a
long period of time is implausible. Perhaps this
fact may help account for why the very large
estimates have been discounted and ignored
by some policymakers. Even a 10% real rate
of return yields a large terminal value when
compounded over 35 or 50 years.
We computed conventional internal rates
of return using the same streams of beneﬁts
and costs simulated by the base-model that
we used to compute the beneﬁt-cost ratios
reported in table 4. The internal rate of return
is by deﬁnition the discount rate that makes
the present value of the beneﬁts equal to the
present value of the costs. Summary results
are reported in table 8, in columns (1) and
(2), while more detailed results for all the
states are presented in table 9. Relative to the
mainstream of the literature, our preferred log
arithmic model yielded estimates at the lower
end of the range for both social and private
annual rates of return to state and federal agri
cultural R&D—around 20%. Speciﬁcally, our
23
Fogel (2007) forecasted that U.S. GDP would reach $41,944
billion in 2040 and that global GDP would reach $307,857 billion
(2000 purchasing power parity prices).

estimates of own-state rates of return ranged
from 7.4% to 27.6%, with an average of 18.9%
per annum across the states, and the estimates
of national rates of return ranged from 15.3%
to 29.1%, with an average of 22.7% per annum
across the states.
Our estimates of conventional internal rates
of return in columns (1) and (2) of table 8 are
much smaller than those reported typically—
for instance, the 50% annual rate of return
reported by Huffman, Norton and Tweeten
(2011). Even so,we think our own measures are
unrealistically high—for a conceptual reason
as well as because of their unrealistic implica
tions as indicated in table 7. Speciﬁcally, the
conventional internal rate of return implic
itly assumes that the ﬂows of beneﬁts can be
reinvested at the same rate as the investment
being evaluated. It is suited for a situation
where those entities that would pay the cost
would also reap the returns, whereas in the
present context the government pays the cost
but the beneﬁts accrue to producers and con
sumers of farm products. In our application,
if a public research investment is to earn a
rate of return of 50% per annum, the conven
tional calculation will be correct only if the
farmers and consumers to whom the streams
of beneﬁts accrue can (and do) invest their
net beneﬁts at the same 50% rate of return.

Table 9. Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios and Internal Rates of Return
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio

State or Region
Paciﬁc
California
Oregon
Washington
Mountain
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming
N Plains
Kansas
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
S Plains
Arkansas
Louisiana
Mississippi
Oklahoma
Texas
Central
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Ohio
Wisconsin
Southeast
Alabama
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Northeast
Connecticut
Delaware
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Internal Rate of Return

MIRR

State R&E State R&E USDA State R&E State R&E State R&E State R&E
(own-state) (national) intramural (own-state) (national) (own-state) (national)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
21.8
33.3
11.3
20.9
20.0
26.6
31.1
34.0
22.0
7.3
15.6
11.0
12.7
42.4
33.6
51.3
37.3
47.4
20.2
26.8
12.2
15.1
19.0
28.2
33.7
43.0
27.1
57.8
17.1
40.6
34.7
22.4
26.7
15.1
13.4
21.6
20.5
18.5
19.9
11.2
15.7
11.8
3.8
9.4
5.4
15.8
13.5
14.1
4.7
4.4
4.7

Ratio
32.9
43.4
24.1
31.2
31.6
36.9
43.8
44.8
32.2
19.2
28.2
24.5
23.6
54.5
45.3
64.9
46.0
61.7
31.0
35.7
23.0
25.3
31.4
39.4
46.8
53.8
39.4
69.2
31.5
55.4
49.9
37.0
38.3
26.7
24.8
28.2
31.0
30.5
27.5
23.1
31.3
26.3
17.6
18.4
14.2
21.5
20.1
26.1
13.3
14.0
13.7

0.6
1.4
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.3
1.1
0.8
1.3
0.7
1.6
0.3
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1

20.2
24.1
16.3
20.3
19.0
22.1
22.5
23.3
20.4
13.0
18.1
16.0
16.8
24.9
23.3
26.3
23.8
26.3
19.5
21.4
16.8
18.3
19.1
21.9
23.1
25.1
21.7
27.6
19.1
24.7
24.3
20.2
22.1
17.6
17.1
20.5
20.3
19.2
20.6
16.1
18.4
16.7
9.7
14.0
11.8
17.9
17.5
17.5
10.8
10.6
11.3

Percent per Year
23.5
9.1
26.1
10.2
21.3
7.9
23.1
9.2
22.7
8.9
24.5
9.7
25.2
10.0
25.5
10.2
23.1
9.3
19.1
7.0
22.2
8.6
21.3
7.9
20.9
8.2
27.0
10.7
25.6
10.2
28.4
11.1
25.5
10.4
28.4
10.9
22.7
9.0
23.6
9.7
21.0
8.1
21.7
8.5
22.8
9.0
24.5
9.8
25.9
10.1
27.0
10.7
24.6
9.7
29.1
11.4
23.4
8.8
27.3
10.6
27.1
10.3
24.0
9.3
24.8
9.7
22.0
8.3
21.3
8.3
22.4
9.3
23.2
9.2
22.8
8.9
22.8
9.1
20.9
7.9
23.3
8.6
22.0
8.0
18.9
5.7
19.0
7.2
17.6
6.4
20.0
8.6
20.1
8.3
21.7
8.4
17.0
6.1
17.5
6.0
17.5
6.1

10.1
10.7
9.5
10.0
10.0
10.4
10.8
10.8
10.1
9.0
9.8
9.5
9.5
11.2
10.8
11.6
10.9
11.5
10.0
10.3
9.4
9.6
10.1
10.5
10.8
11.2
10.5
11.7
10.1
11.3
11.0
10.4
10.5
9.7
9.6
9.8
10.0
10.0
9.8
9.4
10.1
9.7
8.8
8.8
8.4
9.3
9.1
9.7
8.2
8.4
8.3
Continued

Table 9. Continued
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio

Internal Rate of Return

MIRR

State R&E State R&E USDA
State R&E State R&E State R&E State R&E
(own-state) (national) intramural (own-state) (national) (own-state) (national)
State or Region
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
U.S. averagea

8.3
18.0
2.4
12.4
21.0

18.1
30.3
9.9
21.5
32.1

0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.4

14.2
19.1
7.4
16.2
18.9

19.1
22.8
15.3
20.0
22.7

7.3
8.9
4.8
8.1
8.8

8.9
10.0
7.7
9.3
9.9

Notes: R&E = research and extension; MIRR = modiﬁed internal rate of return. The ﬁgures in columns (6) and (7) are MIRRs assuming a 3% per annum
reinvestment rate. a Average of 48 contiguous U.S. states.

Kierulff (2008) provides a recent discussion
of conventional measures of internal rates of
return, their shortcomings, and the reason a socalled modiﬁed version is preferred for ﬁnan
cial analyses applied to investments that yield
streams of revenue.24
Consider an investment of It dollars in time
t that will yield a ﬂow of beneﬁts, Bt+n , over the
following N years. The conventional internal
rate of return, i, solves the equation
(12)

N
n=0

Bt+n (1 + i)N−n − It (1 + i)N = 0.

Alternatively, suppose the stream of beneﬁts
would be reinvested by the beneﬁciaries (say,
farmers or food consumers) at some exter
nal rate of return, r, which could be different
from the rate for the project being evaluated.
Then we would want to solve for the modi
ﬁed internal rate of return, m, which solves the
problem
(13)

N
n=0

Bt+n (1 + r)N−n − It (1 + m)N = 0.

Intuitively, m is the rate at which one could
afford to borrow the amount to be invested,
It , given that it would generate the ﬂow of
beneﬁts, Bt+n , that would be reinvested at the
external rate, r. It can be seen that the con
ventional calculation of the internal rate of
return is a special case of equation (13), which
assumes r = i(= m), which is implausible for

24
Biondi (2006) suggests that the modiﬁed internal rate of return
concept was ﬁrst proposed by Duvillard in the late 19th century and
was “reinvented” in the late 1950s by Solomon (1956), Hirshleifer
(1958), and Baldwin (1959).

public projects yielding ﬂows of beneﬁts that
imply very large conventional internal rates of
return.
We computed the modiﬁed internal rates
of return corresponding to the conventional
internal rates of return in tables 8 and 9, assum
ing that beneﬁts could be reinvested at a real
rate of 3% per annum (the same rate we used
to compute the beneﬁt-cost ratios). Summary
results are reported in table 8, in columns (3)
and (4), while more detailed results for all
the states are presented in table 9. Our esti
mates of the own-state modiﬁed internal rates
of return ranged from 4.8% to 11.4%, with an
average of 8.8% per annum across the states,
while the estimates of national rates of return
(including interstate spillovers) ranged from
7.7% to 11.7%, with an average of 9.9% per
annum across the states. We also computed
the conventional internal rate of return for
USDA intramural research, which was 18.7%
per annum, and the corresponding modiﬁed
internal rate of return, which was 8.7%. All of
these modiﬁed rates of return are plausible yet
consistent with very high beneﬁt-cost ratios.

Conclusion
Measures of the payoff to public agricultural
R&D are potentially useful for policy, and
this usefulness will be greater if the measures
are transparent, well understood, and credible.
The overwhelming message from the extant lit
erature on the returns to agricultural R&D
is that it has paid handsome dividends and
has been underfunded—yet the underfund
ing pattern persists. In the work reported in
this paper, we set out to develop new evi
dence on the returns to agricultural research
and extension and present it in a new light.

While our estimates apply to both research
and extension, since they enter our model
symmetrically, much of the previous litera
ture has emphasized returns to agricultural
research per se, and that is the benchmark for
comparison.
The work reported here entails several con
tributions. The analysis is based on entirely new
measures of both agricultural productivity and
state and federal government investments in
agricultural research and extension that were
developed speciﬁcally for this purpose. The
models used here are also new and different
from those used previously in some ways that
have implications for ﬁndings. In particular we
tested for lag length in a ﬂexible gamma lag dis
tribution model and, compared with typically
used models, our preferred model suggests a
much longer lag length, which in turn has impli
cations for measured rates of return. In addi
tion, we used a new approach to model spatial
spillovers, based on the similarity of commod
ity composition rather than spatial proximity,
and evaluated the implications. Rather than
simply impose a set of modeling assumptions,
we evaluated the implications of our own
modeling choices versus alternatives typically
reported for ﬁndings with respect to returns to
research.We found that some elements of spec
iﬁcation choices had quite signiﬁcant impacts
on ﬁndings but that the main ﬁnding was con
sistent across models: a very high social payoff
to the investment with very signiﬁcant state-to
state spillover effects compounding incentive
problems and justifying a signiﬁcant federal
role.
Nevertheless, the combination of speciﬁca
tion choices in our preferred model resulted in
a much lower conventionally measured inter
nal rate of return to research than has been
reported typically in previous studies. These
comparatively low rates of return reﬂect our
comparatively long lags and our greater atten
tion to reducing other sources of misattribu
tion bias that have contributed to very high
rates of return found in some studies (as dis
cussed by, e.g., Alston and Pardey [2001]),
and the comparison lends credibility to our
results. Moreover, we show that the conven
tional internal rate of return measures are
implausible. Our modiﬁed internal rates of
return are much lower than the very high rates
that are still part of the mainstream in the
literature and being presented to policymak
ers. These new ﬁndings regarding the prevalent
use of a ﬂawed metric provide some empiri
cal justiﬁcation for the skepticism sometimes

expressed about very high estimated rates of
return to research, which may have contributed
in turn to skepticism about the value of the
investment.
To address that skepticism, we developed
simple, approximate measures of beneﬁt-cost
ratios. These measures are based on comparing
the value of productivity growth with the cost
of investments in agricultural research, without
speciﬁcally modeling the statistical relation
ship between productivity and spending over
space and time, thereby avoiding the prob
lem of speciﬁcation bias. They generate similar
measures to those coming from the econo
metric analysis, illustrating the point that the
econometric estimates reﬂect the same funda
mental forces at work. Speciﬁcally, agricultural
productivity growth is worth many times more
than the annual spending on agricultural R&D
(including extension). Even if only a fraction
is attributed to R&D, and even if the lags are
very long, the implied beneﬁt-cost ratio will be
very large.
Our speciﬁc empirical results are interesting,
but in this work we have sought to emphasize
the insights we can draw from the overall pat
tern and robustness of the evidence. Through
out we have emphasized two elements: (a)
the spatial and temporal attribution problems
associated with modeling R&D lags and (b)
spatial spillovers. Our results show that R&D
lags are very long, much longer than most pre
vious studies have allowed, which has potential
implications for problems for policy prescrip
tions, as well as econometric biases. Likewise,
spatial spillovers are empirically important,
contributing to important differences between
state-speciﬁc and national beneﬁts from SAES
research. Studies that do not account appropri
ately for spillovers may suffer from economet
ric biases and could yield inappropriate policy
prescriptions.
The ﬁnding of substantial interstate technol
ogy spillovers suggests that states would underinvest in agricultural R&D from a national
perspective, even if they did not underinvest
from a narrower state-speciﬁc perspective.
Federal support for SAES research can be
justiﬁed on these grounds. As well as providing
a justiﬁcation for federal support of SAES
research, spatial technology spillovers provide
a justiﬁcation for intramural research by the
USDA. Our results indicate that even with
substantial support from the federal govern
ment, most states substantially underinvest in
agricultural R&D, in the sense that both the
in-state and national returns well exceed the

costs of additional investments in agricultural
R&D; they also indicate that these institu
tional failures continue to impose very large
opportunity costs on individual states and the
nation as a whole.
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